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THE RESCUE DOCTRINE FOLLOWING THE ADVENT OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
Though the United States has historically avoided judicial imposition of a
duty to rescue,' the law places great value on human life and has developed the
rescue doctrine to encourage third parties to render aid to those in need.2 This
doctrine not only establishes rescuers as a foreseeable class of intervening
actors, but also reduces the potential bar to recovery created by contributory
negligence.3 As a result, a rescuer under the common law could recover damages
from the original tortfeasor for injuries suffered unless the rescuer's actions were
reckless, willful, or wanton.4 In Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the
Fourth Circuit explained the rescue doctrine: "[T]he law has so high a regard for
human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless
made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness." 5
Along with the development of the rescue doctrine, many states adopted
comparative negligence, which is designed to mitigate the harsh effects of
contributory negligence.6 Because both the rescue doctrine and comparative
negligence were designed to remove the bar to recovery created by contributory
negligence, states must decide how the two doctrines interact. Jurisdictions
disagree how the rescue doctrine interacts with their comparative negligence
systems. South Carolina has not yet had occasion to decide the effect of
comparative negligence on the rescue doctrine.
This Comment suggests the direction South Carolina should take if
confronted with a case involving an injured rescuer. In doing so, this Comment
analyzes two relevant issues involved in determining how to apply the rescue
doctrine in light of comparative negligence-proximate cause and contributory
negligence. Part II gives background information on the rescue doctrine,
contributory negligence, and comparative negligence. Part III analyzes the
1. Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 675-76 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 440,450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(citing Doran v. Kansas City, 237 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951)) (stating that because the law
values human life, "the rescuer was justified in exposing himself to a danger").
3. See id. at 449, 450.
4. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'don other
grounds, 824 F.2d 330, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1987); Allison, 738 S.W.2d at 450 (citing Lowrey v. Horvath,
689 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Mo. 1985)).
5. Furka, 755 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 227 A.2d 751, 753-54 (Md.
1967)).
6. See, e.g., F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS,
183-84 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing comparative negligence in South Carolina); W. PAGE KEETON ETAL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 471 & n.30 (5th ed. 1984).
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current state of the law in South Carolina. Part IV examines how other
jurisdictions have addressed the rescue doctrine in light of comparative
negligence. Part V suggests the proper approach South Carolina should take and
sets forth possible jury instructions. Part VI argues that comparative negligence
should not apply to a rescuer unless the rescuer's acts or omissions constitute
gross negligence because the central purpose of the rescue doctrine is to
encourage and promote rescue attempts. Therefore, South Carolina should
follow the jurisdictions continuing to hold that comparative negligence has not
subsumed the rescue doctrine.
II. THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE RESCUE DOCTRINE, CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE, & COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. Traditional Role of the Rescue Doctrine
The rescue doctrine serves two purposes. First, the rescue doctrine
establishes "a causal nexus linking the tortfeasor's negligent conduct to the
rescuer's injuries."7 A rescuer, by definition, is a bystander who, "[u]nder the
impulse of danger,... was undertaking to render aid."8 The person needing aid
must either be in imminent peril, or the rescuer must reasonably believe the
person was in imminent peril.9 Because the rescuer intervenes following the
wrongdoer's negligent act, the rescue doctrine holds the rescuer as a foreseeable
victim of the original negligent act.1" As stated by the Georgia Court of Appeals,
"[T]he chain of causation remains intact, since it is reasonably to be anticipated
that, once such peril to life or property is initiated and brought into being by the
negligence of a defendant, reasonable attempts will be undertaken to alleviate
and nullify the consequences of such peril."'"
Second, the doctrine prevents the "harsh inequity of barring relief under
principles of contributory negligence to a person who is injured in a rescue
attempt."' 2 Originally, contributory negligence posed a complete bar to recovery
for the negligent rescuer without considering the extent of the rescuer's
negligence in comparison to the defendant's negligence. 3 To encourage rescue
attempts, the rescue doctrine raised the ordinary negligence standard to rash,
reckless, or wanton."
7. Estate of Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669, 683 (Mich. 1990).
8. See Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958).
9. Cf Solomon, 457 N.W.2d at 683 (stating that the issue in Michigan is not whether the victim
is in actual danger, but whether the rescuer acted as a reasonable person would in the same or similar
circumstances).
10. See Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964).
11. Id.
12. Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I. 1992) (citing Wilson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co.,
69 A. 364, 371 (R.I. 1908); Willis v. Providence Telegram Publ'g Co., 38 A. 947, 948 (1897)).
13. Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 440,450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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As a result of these two purposes, the rescue doctrine encourages the
important social policy of rescue encapsulated in "Good Samaritan" statutes.
South Carolina's Good Samaritan Statute' 5 provides that anyone who renders
assistance to a victim at the scene of an emergency shall not be held civilly
liable for "any personal injury as a result of any act or omission ... except acts
or omissions amounting to gross negligence or wilful or wanton misconduct."' 6
Because there is no common law duty to rescue absent certain exceptions," it is
important to promote rescue attempts by individuals who are otherwise under no
duty to rescue.' 8 Professor Antony M. Honor6 accurately states the importance
of the rescue doctrine in promoting aid to those in need: "There is no neutrality.
If the law does not encourage rescue, it is sure to discourage it. If it does not
compensate, it will indirectly penalize."'
' 9
B. Proximate Cause
For an injured rescuer to recover from the original tortfeasor, the rescuer
must establish that the tortfeasor's conduct was both the cause-in-fact and the
proximate cause of the rescuer's injuries. 2° While several tests for proximate
cause have been suggested, South Carolina has adopted foreseeability as the test
for proximate cause.2' As stated in Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,22 "Foreseeability of
some injury from an act or omission is a prerequisite to its being a proximate
cause of the injury for which recovery is sought."23
South Carolina's general test is consistent with the rescue doctrine's
emphasis on foreseeability. For a rescuer to recover from the original tortfeasor,
the rescuer must be foreseeable and must not be an intervening actor who breaks
the chain of causation.24 In Wagner v. International Railway, the defendant
railway company argued that the rescuer had time to consider his action and thus
15. See Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1986)
(referring to S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-3 10 as the "Good Samaritan Act").
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (2005 & Supp. 2006); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8332 (2006)
(providing, like South Carolina's statute, that a rescuer is not liable to the victim for acts or omissions
at the scene of an accident unless those acts or omissions amount to gross negligence).
17. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 675-76.
18. William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1126-27 (2001).
19. Antony M. Honord, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 225,
232 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966).
20. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 6, at 137-38.
21. See generally id at 148-50 (noting that there are many other ways to phrase the test for
proximate cause including "direct cause," "efficient cause," and "substantial factor," but that
foreseeability is a widely used test).
22. 270 S.C. 453, 462 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
23. Id. at 462,242 S.E.2d at 675 (1978) (quoting Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 161, 161 S.E.2d
171, 173 (1968)).
24. See Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921) (involving a rescuer who injured
himself while attempting to save his cousin who fell from a train).
2007]
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broke the chain of causation." Justice Cardozo dismissed the argument stating,
"Continuity in such circumstances is not broken by the exercise of volition. 26
Moreover, Cardozo noted that a distinction should not be drawn between the
rescuer who acts on impulse and the rescuer who weighs the risks of danger.27
The Wagner test is often quoted and widely accepted by courts for the
notion that rescuers as a class are foreseeable so long as they are not reckless.28
As stated by Justice Cardozo, "Danger invites rescue .... The emergency begets
the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is
accountable as if he had.''29 While reasonable rescue is foreseeable, jurisdictions
disagree as to whether negligent rescue should be considered foreseeable to
allow the rescuer to recover damages.3"
C. Contributory Negligence
Prior to the adoption of comparative fault system, contributory negligence
barred the rescuer from recovery where the rescuer was rash or reckless or
created the situation that invited the rescue.31
D. Impact of Comparative Negligence
Almost all jurisdictions, including South Carolina, have now adopted some
form of comparative negligence allowing the negligent plaintiff to recover, less
the proportion of fault attributable to the plaintiff.32 In South Carolina, the
plaintiff's recovery is not barred by contributory negligence unless the plaintiff's
negligence exceeds the defendant's negligence.33
The adoption of comparative negligence in South Carolina and other
jurisdictions has affected several common law doctrines. 4 The last clear chance
doctrine, recklessness, and assumption of risk have been supplanted by
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86, 87 (N.Y. 1918); Donnelly v.
H.C. & A.I. Piercy Contracting Co., 118 N.E. 605, 606 (N.Y. 1918); Twomley v. Cent. Park, N. & E.
River R.R., 69 N.Y. 158, 160 (1877)).
27. Id.
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 44, at 307-08; see also Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345,
357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958) (indicating that rescuers are foreseeable as a class (quoting Wagner, 133
N.E. at 437)).
29. Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437-38 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
30. See infra Part IV.
31. Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 440, 450-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
32. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 6, at 183-84.
33. Id. at 183 (citing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243,243-44, 399 S.E.2d 783, 783
(1991)).
34. See, e.g., id. at 186-88 (discussing whether recklessness and the last clear chance doctrine have
been subsumed by comparative negligence).
[Vol. 58: 641
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comparative negligence in almost all jurisdictions, including South Carolina.35
For instance, the last clear chance doctrine allowed a plaintiff who was negligent
to recover damages if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident.36 However, the last clear chance doctrine does not serve the same
purpose as the rescue doctrine. The last clear chance doctrine ameliorated the
harsh effect of contributory negligence,37 but the rescue doctrine encourages
people to assist others in emergency situations. After the adoption of
comparative negligence, the rescue doctrine has been retained by some states,
yet partly subsumed into comparative negligence by others.38 South Carolina has
not had occasion to address the rescue doctrine in light of comparative
negligence.
III. STATUS OF THE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina has previously addressed the rescue doctrine in two respects.
First, South Carolina's Good Samaritan Statute encourages rescue attempts by
providing that anyone who renders assistance to a victim at the scene of an
emergency shall not be held civilly liable for personal injuries resulting from any
acts or omissions "except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or
wilful or wanton misconduct. 3 9
The South Carolina Court of Appeals discussed the operation of the statute
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,40 which involved the death of one of
the fraternity's potential members due to acute alcohol intoxication.4 1 Sigma Nu
appealed the verdict of the trial court that held the fraternity liable for Mr.
Ballou's son's death.42 On appeal, the fraternity argued that the trial judge
committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the South Carolina
Good Samaritan Statute.43 The court of appeals stated that, because the jury
found the fraternity acted with "willful, wanton, or reckless conduct," the statute
did not provide a shield from liability.44
35. See Spahn v. Town of Port Royal, 326 S.C. 632, 640-41,486 S.E.2d 507, 511-12 (Ct. App.
1997), aff'd as modified, 330 S.C. 168, 173, 499 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1998) (holding the last clear chance
doctrine has been subsumed by comparative negligence); see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 6, at
186-88, 191-93 (discussing how South Carolina courts have dealt with recklessness, last clear chance,
and assumption of risk following the adoption of comparative negligence); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 67, at 477-78.
36. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 6, at 187-88.
37. Id.
38. Compare Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992) (holding no common law duties
changed when the state adopted its comparative negligence statute), with Cords v. Anderson, 259
N.W.2d 672,683 (Wis. 1977) (finding that comparative negligence principles apply in an unreasonable
rescue).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
40. 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1986).
41. Id. at 143, 145,352 S.E.2d at 491, 492.
42. Id. at 142, 352 S.E.2d at 490.
43. Id. at 155, 352 S.E.2d at 497.
44. Id. at 155-56, 352 S.E.2d at 498.
2007] TORT LAW
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Second, prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, South Carolina
courts addressed the rescue doctrine, specifically regarding proximate cause, in
Brown v. National Oil Co. 45 Brown involved a fire at a filling station that started
when West, a bystander, lit a match while a truck delivered gas to the station.46
The fire strengthened when West pulled the truck's hose out of the station's
filler pipe.47 The jury entered a verdict for the plaintiff;48 however, the trial judge
granted the oil company's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.49
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the evidence presented a
question for the jury on proximate cause.5"
In so holding, the court determined that West acted as a rescuer in removing
the hose from the filler pipe.51 The court, addressing the issue of proximate
cause, conceded that West's acts may have been negligent, but they were not
"wanton or foolhardy" and did not bar recovery. 2 Furthermore, the court recited
part of Wagner v. International Railway Co.: "Danger invites rescue. The cry of
distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the
mind. In tracing conduct to its consequences it recognizes them as normal."53
The Good Samaritan Statute and Brown, while not addressing comparative
negligence, provide guidance as to how a South Carolina court may rule in a
case involving the rescue doctrine.
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Proximate Cause
The leading case regarding the rescue doctrine and proximate cause is
Wagner v. International Railway Co.5 4 In Wagner, a train rounded a bridge, and
Wagner's cousin was thrown from a door that the conductor failed to close. 5
Wagner sounded an alarm, and the train stopped just beyond the bridge.56 It was
dark, and Wagner went back to the bridge.5" Wagner found nothing but his
cousin's hat, and as he searched, he lost his footing and fell to the ground
beneath the bridge.5" Wagner sued the railway company for his injuries.59
45. 233 S.C. 345, 347, 357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 82, 87 (1958).
46. Id. at 349, 105 S.E.2d at 83.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 347, 105 S.E.2d at 82.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 357, 105 S.E.2d at 87.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921)).
54. 133 N.E. at 437.
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The Wagner trial court found for the railway company.6" The trial court held
Wagner could not recover as a matter of law unless the conductor both invited
him on the bridge and followed with a lantern.6' Justice Cardozo, writing for the
New York Court of Appeals, reversed the decision:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to
relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in
tracing conduct to its consequences. . . . The wrong that
imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong
also to his rescuer. . . .The risk of rescue, if only it be not
wanton, is born of the occasion.62
Cardozo focused on the foreseeability of the attempted rescue. The court
noted that the reaction of the rescuer to the situation of peril is one of instinct.
63
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the elapsed time between
the accident and the rescue attempt broke the chain of causation.64 Cardozo
noted that Wagner did not stop to deliberate his actions from the time of
accident until the point Wagner fell.65 The law seeks to encourage rescue and
"does not discriminate between the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who
counts the cost. ' 66 Based on the rescue doctrine principles espoused by Justice
Cardozo, the judgment was reversed.67
In Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson,6 8 the Georgia Court of Appeals followed
principles similar to those in Wagner and explained the rescue doctrine as it
relates to proximate cause.69 Johnson involved a firefighter who volunteered to
help extinguish a petroleum plant fire.7 ° The court reasoned through existing
Georgia case law to describe the role of proximate cause within the rescue
doctrine.7' The following standard is much like the standard in Wagner:
[I]nsofar as the proximate cause of any injuries that a rescuer
sustains as a result of his efforts is concerned, the chain of
causation remains intact, since it is reasonably to be anticipated
that, once such peril to life or property is initiated and brought
into being by the negligence of a defendant, reasonable
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 437-38 (citation omitted).





68. 139 S.E.2d 496,499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964).
69. Id. at 499.
70. Id. at 497-98.
71. Id. at 499.
2007]
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attempts will be undertaken to alleviate and nullify the
consequences of such peril.72
Florida has also followed a similar test for determining proximate cause. In
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Korte,73 the court stated that, although the rescue
doctrine is "no longer necessary to relieve a rescuer from the absolute bar of
contributory negligence, [it] is still applicable to establish that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. ' 74 Furthermore, the
court stated, "[W]here the defendant has created a situation of peril for another
the defendant will be held in law to have caused the peril not only to the victim
but also to his rescuer, and so to have caused any injury suffered by the rescuer
in his rescue attempt." 75
Not all states have been willing to adopt the Wagner standard for
foreseeability. The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the rescue doctrine
and proximate cause in Pachesky v. Getz.76 In Pachesky, the appellant-rescuer
returned home from work to find a car parked in the middle of the road-the
appellee was slumped over the wheel.77 Appellant and her husband repeatedly
struck the windshield of the car attempting to wake appellee.7' Believing that he
was suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning, appellant opened the driver's
side door, "rolled down the window and turned off the ignition., 79 The car then
rolled down the hill, and the open door hit appellant, causing physical injuries."
Appellants argued the jury charge on causation was in error.81 The charge
stated, "Proximate means immediate, nearest, next in order, and in its legal
sense, closest in causal connection. '82 According to appellants, the jury charge
was erroneous because it could have led the jury to consider the appellant as a
supervening actor.83 While the majority in Pachesky did not find reversible error
in the charge as a whole, it did note that the jury instruction may have been
"unnecessarily limiting., 84
The dissent in Pachesky, however, found the jury charge to be reversible
error.85 According to the dissent, "Causation is not a separate consideration in
72. Id.
73. 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
74. Id. at 230.
75. Id. (citing J. Tiley, The Rescue Principle, 30 MOD. L. R. 25, 25 (1967)).
76. See 510 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("[T]he relative causal negligence of the [rescuer
and tortfeasor] should be apportioned ....




81. Id. at 779.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 780.
85. Id. at 787 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 58:641
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determining the applicability of the rescue doctrine."86 If the jury determined
that a wrongdoer placed an individual in a position that invited rescue, then the
wrongdoer is liable to the rescuer-no consideration is needed as to causation.87
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm88 also
proposes an approach to proximate cause similar to the dissent's approach in
Pachesky.89 The Restatement provides the following guidance:
[I]f an actor's tortious conduct imperils another or the property
of another, the scope of the actor's liability includes any
physical harm to a person resulting from that person's efforts to
aid or protect the imperiled person or property, so long as the
harm arises from a risk that inheres in the effort to provide
aid.90
The proposed draft alters the original Restatement's view of proximate cause in
relation to the rescue doctrine.9 Section 445 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts stated that a rescuer's "normal efforts" to rescue an individual were not
superseding. 92 The proposed draft expands the original wording by "eliminating
the 'normal efforts' qualification."93 Additionally, the proposal eliminates the
consideration of "superseding cause and proximate cause as barriers to
recovery. 94 However, while the proposed draft expands the reach of the rescue
doctrine, the comments indicate the rescuer's injury must bear some semblance
to the expected harms of a rescue attempt.
95
Like Pennsylvania, the Ohio Court of Appeals diverged from the Wagner
standard regarding proximate cause in Reese v. Minor.9 6 Reese involved an
accident caused by Hermann, who lost control of his car as he rounded a curve
and then flipped onto the side of the eastbound lane.97 Upon finding the
defendant on the side of the road, Reese pulled over and attempted to stop a car
in the westbound lane.98 However, as Reese stood in the eastbound lane, Minor
came upon the scene and collided with Reese. 99 The court of appeals, affirming
the lower court, held the plaintiffs actions were unforeseeable in the
86. Id. at 785.
87. Id.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
2005).
89. Id. § 32.
90. Id.




95. Id. § 32 cmt. c.
96. 442 N.E.2d 782, 783-84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
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undertaking of a rescuer. 100 Furthermore, the break in causation was such that
"[t]o imply that Hermann should be held accountable for this kind of behavior is
to place him in the position of Reese's insurer."'0 '
Based on the aforementioned case law, the proximate cause standards
among jurisdictions clearly differ. However, a considerable number of
jurisdictions continue to employ the Wagner standard to determine proximate
cause. 102
B. Comparative Negligence
The rescue doctrine has not been considered by a South Carolina court
following the state's adoption of comparative negligence. The rescue doctrine
could interact with comparative negligence in two distinct ways. A South
Carolina court could rule that the Wagner standard should continue as an
independent standard of care, and only when the rescuer's actions fall below that
standard may his negligence be compared. Or, a court may rule that comparative
negligence has subsumed the rescue doctrine. If a court abrogates the rescue
doctrine, the nature of the rescue simply becomes a factor to consider in
apportioning fault.
The following decisions hold that the rescue doctrine is a standard of care
independent of comparative negligence. In Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., the Fourth Circuit addressed the rescue doctrine and comparative
negligence in the context of admiralty law. 3 In Furka, the decedent allegedly
attempted a rescue during rough waters. 4 The decedent responded to a call for
help from a sailor when no other boats were able to assist. 0 5 However, the
stranded sailor would not leave his boat, and when the decedent turned toward
shore, the decedent's boat began to flood and he eventually drowned. 6 The jury
awarded damages in the suit brought by the decedent's widow.'0 7 However, the
jury found the decedent was 65% contributorily negligent and reduced the
damages.'08
100. See id. at 784. But see Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 637, 640 (Kan. 1989) (holding that
a rescuer who sought another individual to signal cars to stop was still acting as a rescuer and therefore,
the chain of causation had not broken).
101. Reese, 442 N.E.2d at 784.
102. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1090 (4th Cir. 1985); Walker
Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496,499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Pachesky v. Getz, 510 A.2d 776, 783
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958) (quoting
Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921)); see also F. Patrick Hubbard, Professor, Univ. of
S.C. Sch. of Law, Intervening Actors & The "Elusive Butterfly" of Proximate Cause, 2006 South
Carolina Tort Law Update 6 (2006) (stating there is "[o]verwhelming agreement that [the] Wagner test
should be used").
103. 755 F.2d at 1087-88.
104. Id. at 1087.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1087-88.
108. Id. at 1088.
[Vol. 58:641
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss3/11
TORT LAW
On appeal, the widow contended that the court did not properly instruct the
jury on the rescue doctrine." 9 The Fourth Circuit stated, "The instruction in this
case failed to inform the jury that no contributory negligence may be inferred
from a rescue attempt alone and further that no comparative fault may be
assessed unless plaintiffs conduct was wanton or reckless."" 0 In holding that
comparative negligence does not subsume the rescue doctrine, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that other jurisdictions have held the negligence of the rescuer
should be compared."' However, the court stated,
We do not think that is the appropriate course here. . . . The
best traditions of seafaring men demand that we honor attempts
to rescue . . . . The wanton and reckless standard reflects the
value society places upon rescue as much as any desire to avoid
a total defeat of recovery under common law. Law must
encourage an environment where human instinct is not insular
but responds to the plight of another in peril." 2
Therefore, the court expressed that the law should encourage rescue by not
imputing negligence on efforts to preserve life unless those effects are rash or
reckless.' '
Bridges v. Bentley"l 4 is another case holding comparative negligence does
not subsume the rescue doctrine."5 Bridges, the plaintiff, was driving a fertilizer
truck on Highway 50.16 Bentley, who was driving a truck towing a car,
attempted to pass Bridges, but was unable to do so and struck an oncoming
car." 7 Bridges stopped to assist the victims of the accident, first asking another
individual "to stop oncoming traffic.""' As Bridges walked toward the cars in
the accident, a truck struck the vehicles at the scene, which in turn, struck
Bridges and injured him." 9 At trial, the judge instructed the jury on the rescue
doctrine:"'
A person who is injured while attempting to rescue another
from peril in an emergency situation is not negligent merely on
the ground that the rescue entails danger to himself. The law
has a high regard for human life and efforts to save it. Danger
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. lId. at 1088-89.
112. Id. at 1089.
113. See id.
114. 769 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1989).
115. Id. at 640.
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invites rescue. The impulse to respond to an urgent call for aid,
without complete regard for one's own safety, is recognized as
normal. The law will not impute negligence to an effort to
preserve life unless made under such circumstances as to be
rash or wanton. Conduct is rash or wanton when it is
undertaken in utter disregard of the consequences. 2'
In conclusion, the jury was instructed not to find negligence if Bridge's actions
were not rash or wanton.
22
The defendant argued that while the jury instruction correctly stated the
rescue doctrine, the rescue doctrine no longer applied in Kansas because of the
establishment of comparative negligence.1 23 The Kansas Supreme Court rejected
this argument.1 24 The court's reasoning behind the continuation of the rescue
doctrine was three-fold. First, the court noted that there had been "'no change' in
common law duties [with] the enactment of... comparative negligence.' ' 25 The
court stated the comparative negligence statute .'distribute[s] liability on the
basis of causal fault. It does not concern the nature and extent of the
duty .... ,,, 126
The court next considered the legislative intent and concluded the Kansas
legislature did not intend to nullify the rescue doctrine. 27 In support of this
conclusion, the court cited the Kansas Good Samaritan Statute, which uses gross
negligence as the standard for emergency care given by health care providers at
the scene of an accident. 2  The court reasoned that the "statute has been
amended many times since the introduction of comparative negligence and so
does not continue its existence only through oversight."'1
29
Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court looked to other jurisdictions, including
Missouri and the Fourth Circuit. 30 After reviewing the holdings in Allison and
Furka, the court concluded that rescue is a "sound policy to encourage."'' In
taking the position adopted by Missouri and the Fourth Circuit, the court argued




123. Id. at 638.
124. Id. at 639.
125. Id. at 638-39; see also M. Bruenger & Co. v. Dodge City Truck Stop, Inc., 675 P.2d 864, 869
(Kan. 1984) (holding in various contexts that the advent of comparative negligence does not change
common law duties).
126. Bridges, 769 P.2d at 638 (quoting Britt v. Allen County Cmty. Junior Coll., 638 P.2d 914,
917 (Kan. 1982)).
127. Id. at 639-40.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 640.
130. Id. at 639 (citing Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 440,454 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987); Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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Therefore, the court upheld the jury instruction that did not impute negligence to
the rescuer unless his actions were rash or reckless.'33 The court concluded that
lowering the standard to ordinary negligence for potential rescuers "would be
one more weapon in the arsenal of the 'don't-get-involved' creed of citizenship
which is already too prevalent."'34
Another example of a court holding that the rescue doctrine continues to
operate independently of comparative negligence is Ouellette v. Carde.'35 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a rescuer's damages should not be
compared unless the rescue is performed in a rash or reckless manner.'36 In
Ouellette, the defendant, Carde, became trapped under his car in the garage
while attempting to change the muffler and tailpipe. 37 When the car fell off a
jack, "the gas tank landed on the right stanchion jack puncturing the tank and
releasing approximately ten gallons of gas onto the garage floor."'3 18 Carde
telephoned his neighbor, Ouellette, for help, and she entered through the front of
the house and eventually found Carde trapped under the car.'39 Carde instructed
her to leave via the garage by pressing the electric garage door opener. 40 As the
garage door opened, the gas ignited, causing severe bums to both Ouellette and
Carde. 141
In affirming the judgment for Ouellette and maintaining the rescue doctrine
in conjunction with comparative negligence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
based its holding on two findings. 42 First, the court looked to the purpose of the
rescue doctrine and determined that allowing comparative negligence to
subsume the doctrine "does not fully protect the rescue doctrine's underlying
policy of promoting rescue.' ' 143 The court noted that the rescue doctrine was
designed to encourage individuals to undertake rescue attempts absent an
affirmative duty to act. 4' Furthermore, the court stated, "The law places a
premium on human life, and one who voluntarily attempts to save a life of
another should not be barred from complete recovery."'
145
Second, the court applied the same line of reasoning used by the Kansas
Supreme Court: the advent of comparative negligence has not changed common
law duties, and therefore, it does not affect the rescue doctrine.' 46 In conclusion,
the court found it should not reduce Ouellette's recovery pursuant to the
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 688.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 688-89.
140. Id. at 689.
14 1. Id.
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principles of comparative negligence because the rescue was neither rash nor
reckless. 147
Georgia and Missouri have also decided a separate threshold for rescuers
should exist; once that threshold is met, comparative negligence should apply.'48
In Lorie v. Standard Oil Co., the court addressed the appropriate standard of care
to be applied under the rescue doctrine. 4 9 The case involved Lorie's attempt to
rescue an excavation worker stranded in a collapsed pit. 50 Hearing that the
excavation pit collapsed, Lorie hastened to the pit, squatted to his hands and
knees, and then leaped onto a gasoline storage tank.' 5' While Lorie was on top of
the gasoline tank, a falling object struck and injured Lorie's head.' 52 Though the
trial court awarded Lorie damages for personal injuries, Lorie appealed,
claiming error in the trial court's jury charge that led to a diminished recovery.'53
The trial court instructed the jury on the rescue doctrine:'54
The rescue doctrine applies when the defendants' negligent acts
or omissions have created a condition or situation which
involves imminent and urgent peril to life and property. In such
instances, those negligent acts or omissions are also negligent
in relationship to all others who, in the exercise of ordinary care
for their own safety under the circumstances, attempt to rescue
the endangered life or property by reasonably appropriate
means. 155
The Georgia Court of Appeals held the trial court's jury charge was in error
because it did not reflect the appropriate standard of care for rescuers. 56 The
court noted that greater importance is attached to attempts to save human life
than attempts to rescue property only;'57 thus, a higher level of risk is allowed.'58
The court found that the rescuer's recovery would not be barred because of a
failure to "exercise ordinary care for his own safety or even that he assumed the
risk of injury to himself unless his actions are so imprudent and beyond what a
person in the same circumstances might be expected to do that they must be
classified as reckless or wanton.'
' 59
147. Id.
148. See Lorie v. Standard Oil Co., 368 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Allison v. Sverdrup &
Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
149. Id. at 767.









159. Id. (citing Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 32 S.E.2d 420, 421-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1944)).
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In addition, the court held that the jury should have been instructed on
comparative negligence. 16' To determine the rescuer's negligence, the court must
apply the appropriate standard of care-reckless or wanton.'6 ' Consequently, it
appears that in Georgia, comparative negligence applies unless the jury
determines that the actions of the rescuer were not reckless. 1
6 2
Similar to Georgia's analysis of the rescue doctrine and comparative
negligence, Missouri also continues to recognize the rescue doctrine but finds
comparative negligence principles applicable as well. In Allison v. Sverdrup &
Parcel & Assoc.,' 63 the Missouri Court of Appeals determined the application of
comparative negligence to the rescue doctrine. 6 4 Allison involved equipment
maintenance for a science experiment that Coors Brewing Company (Coors)
donated to the University of Missouri-Rolla (UMR).'65 Several UMR researchers
collaborated with researchers at Sverdrup on a research project to produce useful
gases from wood. 6 6 To remove a build-up of sawdust on the inner walls of the
equipment, a research assistant climbed into the equipment. 167 Despite the
potential danger, the assistant did not wear a protective mask and subsequently
collapsed while still inside. 168 In an effort to rescue his colleague, Allison
climbed into the equipment wearing a mask for protection. 169 However, both the
assistant and Allison asphyxiated due to a build-up of carbon monoxide inside
the equipment.
170
The trial court determined that Allison was 100% at fault and did not award
damages for his rescue attempt. '7' On appeal, Allison's survivors alleged the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the rescue doctrine while
instructing on comparative fault. 172 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the
principles of comparative negligence should apply when the rescuer is
negligent. 173 However, the court noted, "[A] person who sees another in
imminent peril created by the negligence of [the] defendant will not be charged
with negligence in risking his or her own life or serious injury in an attempt to
rescue, provided he or she does not act recklessly or rashly.'
174
160. Id. at 768.
161. Id.
162. See id
163. 738 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
164. Id. at 444. See generally Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo. 1983) (discussing
the adoption of pure comparative fault in Missouri).
165. Allison, 738 S.W.2d at 444.
166. See id. at 444-46.
167. Id. at 447.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 448.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 442.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 454.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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In holding that a rescuer's actions are not negligent unless they amount to
recklessness or rashness,' 75 the court recognized the important role the rescue
doctrine has and continues to play in Missouri. The court quoted Justice
Cardozo's famous words from Wagner regarding the rescue doctrine. 76 The
court then commented that Missouri has recognized the rescue doctrine as an
important concept designed to encourage the preservation of human life.'77
However, the court was also persuaded by the reasoning of jurisdictions
applying comparative negligence principles to the rescue doctrine.'78 Therefore,
based on the desire to encourage rescue attempts while recognizing the impact of
comparative negligence, the court concluded that a rescuer is negligent only if
his efforts are rash or reckless. 179 If the rescuer is negligent, then the principles
of comparative negligence apply. 8°
Despite the general trend toward greater judicial encouragement of rescue
attempts, many states, including Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, have
held that comparative negligence partially subsumes the rescue doctrine.' 8' The
following cases allowed rescue to remain a factor in determining percentage of
negligence but do not retain the higher threshold set forth in Wagner.
In Sweetman, the court held that comparative negligence subsumed the
rescue doctrine in a case involving an accident on an icy road.' 82 Sweetman,
upon seeing the accident, stopped her car and intended to alert oncoming traffic
to the icy conditions.'83 While attempting to warn a group of cars, Sweetman
was severely injured when she was hit by a car that lost control on the ice.' 84 On
appeal, Sweetman argued that because she acted as a rescuer, the trial court
erred in applying comparative negligence and reducing her recovery.8 5
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that while the rescue doctrine is still
applicable to establish causation,'86 the rash or reckless standard no longer
applies.'87 Instead, the court held that the rescue doctrine poses a question for the
trier of fact as to whether a reasonable person under similar circumstances would
175. Id.
176. See id at 449 (quoting Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437-38 (N.Y. 1921) ("Danger
invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of
the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal.")).
177. See id at 450.
178. Id. at 452-54.
179. Id. at 454.
180. Id.
181. See Sweetman v. State Highway Dep't, 357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Pachesky
v. Cetz, 510 A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Cords v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 672 (Wis. 1977).
182. See Sweetman, 357 N.W.2d at 786, 789.
183. Id. at 786.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 788.
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have acted in the same manner as a rescuer. 8 In making this determination, the
jury should balance the usefulness of the rescuer's actions against the degree of
risk involved.'89 The jury should also consider that the risk a rescuer is "justified
in assuming under the circumstances increases in proportion to the imminence of
the danger and the value to be realized from meeting the danger."'' 9 If the
rescuer's actions were unreasonable, then the recovery should be reduced
proportionately.' 9 ' Applying the test to the facts, the court vacated the judgment
of the lower court and remanded for further consideration. 1
92
Wisconsin has also held that comparative negligence subsumes the rescue
doctrine. 193 In Cords v. Anderson, four couples went to Parfrey's Glen to hike
and have a picnic.' 94 Later in the evening, one of the hikers left the group for an
unknown reason and went to an isolated and dangerous trail. 95 As the hiker
attempted to walk the trail, she fell approximately eighty feet to the bottom of
the gorge.'96 Cords descended the steep gorge in an effort to rescue the hiker
below, but she also fell and sustained severe physical injuries.' 97 The trial court
held that the rescue doctrine was not applicable.' 9 On appeal, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the rescue doctrine is applicable where one renders aid
to another in imminent peril. 99 Considering the advent of comparative
negligence in Wisconsin, the court declined to use the Wagner standard and
instead found that a rescuer is not negligent merely because he exposes himself
to a dangerous situation.00 Where the rescue attempt is unreasonably carried out,
the principles of comparative negligence apply and the rescuer's damages will
be reduced proportionately.20 '
In Pachesky v. Getz," 2 the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
comparative negligence eliminated the need for the rash or reckless standard." 3
On appeal, Pachesky argued that comparative negligence did not subsume the
rescue doctrine, and thus, the trial court committed reversible error in instructing
the jury that the rescuer's negligence should be compared with that of the
original tortfeasor a In analyzing whether to retain the reckless standard for
188. Id. (citing Padilla v. Hooks Int'l, Inc., 654 P.2d 574, 578 (N.M. 1982); Calvert v. Ourum, 595
P.2d 1264, 1266 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)).
189. Id. (citing Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Mich. 1977)).
190. Id. (citing Padilla, 654 P.2d at 578; Lave v. Neumann, 317 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Neb. 1982)).
191. Id. (citing Ryder Truck, 357 So. 2d at 789).
192. Id. at 790.
193. Cords v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 672, 683 (Wis. 1977).
194. Id. at 675.
195. See id at 676.
196. Id at 675-76.
197. Id. at 676-77.
198. Id. at 681.
199. See id at 682.
200. Id. at 683.
201. Id.
202. 510 A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
203. Id. at 783.
204. Id. at 780.
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rescuer recovery, the court looked to the policy behind the rescue doctrine. °5
The court also reiterated that the rescue doctrine establishes a causal connection
between the rescuer's injuries and the defendant's negligence while also
removing the bar of contributory negligence.2 6 Furthermore, the court quoted
the often cited words of Justice Cardozo: "Danger invites rescue. The cry of
distress is the summons to relief."20 7
However, after looking to other jurisdictions such as Florida and Wisconsin,
the court concluded that comparative negligence principles should apply if the
rescuer is negligent.0 8 Nevertheless, the court determined the rescue doctrine
continues to establish a "causal connection between a defendant's negligence
and a plaintiff/rescuer's injury, which in turn leaves open the courthouse
door.
20 9
Also noteworthy in Pachesky is the vigorous dissent, which argued that the
twin goals of the rescue doctrine were robbed of meaning by the majority's
holding.210 The dissent advanced its argument for the continuation of the rescue
doctrine unaffected by comparative negligence by noting that the rescue doctrine
is a "unique theory of tort recovery. '21' Importantly, the comparative negligence
statute did not contemplate the rescue doctrine and therefore should not subsume
it.212 The dissent relied on Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.2 3 when
declaring, "The common law doctrine of rescue may be succinctly stated: '[T]he
law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an
effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute
rashness.' '2 4 The Fourth Circuit in Furka found no legislative intent to abrogate
the rescue doctrine, and Pachesky's dissent argued that neither did the
Pennsylvania legislature espouse such an intent.1 5 While jurisdictions do not
agree on a single approach, the rescue doctrine, in light of its important policy
implications, should not be completely subsumed by comparative negligence.
V. PROPOSED SOUTH CAROLINA APPROACH
A. Proximate Cause
As to proximate cause, South Carolina courts should follow the approach set
forth in Wagner v. International Railway Co., 2 16 which holds rescuers are a
205. Id. at 782.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 781 (quoting Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921)).
208. Id. at 782-83.
209. Id. at 783.
210. Id. at 785 (Cavanaugh, I., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 785-86 (citing Furka, 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985)).
214. Id. at 786 (quoting Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 227 A.2d 751, 753-54 (Md. 1967)).
215. Id. at 787.
216. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
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foreseeable class unless their acts or omissions are rash, reckless, or wanton.2 7
Using foreseeability as the test for proximate cause is consistent with South
Carolina case law. As noted in Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,2" South Carolina
courts generally use foreseeability as the test for proximate cause.2 1 9 The South
Carolina Supreme Court has cited Wagner with approval, specifically regarding
the rescue doctrine and proximate cause. 22 ' Following the Wagner approach is
also consistent with other jurisdictions holding rescuers are a foreseeable
class.22'
Furthermore, South Carolina courts should hold, as did Wagner, that
negligent rescue is foreseeable. Rescuers are acting with the "excitement and
confusion of the moment. ' 222 As the Fourth Circuit stated, "In rescue,
promptness may be prudence, and reflex may claim the seat of reason.2 23
Because rescue brings risks unknown, the rescuer should not be penalized for
voluntarily exposing himself to those risks.
South Carolina courts should also consider negligent rescuers as foreseeable
to foster the legislative intent behind the Good Samaritan Statute.224 If the rescue
is performed in a manner short of gross negligence, the rescuer should be able to
recover full damages. 225 Rescue is encouraged by the legislature and has been
encouraged in the past by the supreme court.2 2 6 If negligent rescue attempts are
not considered foreseeable, such a policy creates another disincentive for the
potential rescuer of human life.
A South Carolina court could use a variety of jury instructions regarding
proximate cause and the rescue doctrine. The following proposed jury
instructions are based on case law from other jurisdictions:
1. The increased risk inherent in a rescue attempt does not render
unforeseeable an individual who attempts to rescue someone in danger.
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law
does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its
consequences. It recognizes them as normal., 2 7 Even if the tortfeasor did
217. Id. at 437.
218. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
219. Id. at 462, 242 S.E.2d at 675.
220. See Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958) (quoting Wagner,
133 N.E. at 437).
221. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1090 (4th Cir. 1985); Walker
Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496,499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Pachesky v. Getz, 510 A.2d 776,783
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); see also Hubbard, supra note 102 (noting an "[o]verwhelming agreement that
[the] Wagner test should be used").
222. Furka, 755 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 45 A. 1070, 1074 (Pa.
1900)).
223. Id.
224. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
225. See, e.g., id. (establishing that a rescuer's negligent actions are foreseeable to the tortfeasor
by using a standard of gross negligence).
226. See id.; Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958).
227. Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921).
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not foresee the rescuer, "[h]e is accountable as if he had. '228 "The wrong
that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his
rescuer." 2 9 The response of the rescuer is often guided by the "excitement
and confusion of the moment. '230 "In rescue, promptness may be prudence,
and reflex may claim the seat of reason.",23' "The risk of rescue, if only it be
not wanton, is born of the occasion.
232
a. Rescuer: First, to apply the rescue doctrine, you must find that the
plaintiffs actions were taken to assist an individual in imminent peril,
or who appears to a reasonable person to be in imminent peril, as a
result of the defendant's negligence.
b. Proximate Cause: If you find that the plaintiff was acting as a rescuer,
you must then determine whether the plaintiffs actions were
foreseeable. The plaintiffs actions were foreseeable and did not break
the chain of causation unless the actions or inactions of the plaintiff
regarding the rescue were rash, reckless, or wanton.
2. "A person who is injured while attempting to rescue another from peril in an
emergency situation is not acting in an unforeseeable manner merely on the
ground that the rescue entails dangers to himself. The law has a high regard
for human life or limb and efforts to save it. Danger invites rescue. The
impulse to respond to an urgent call for aid, without complete regard for
one's own safety, is recognized as normal. The law does not regard an effort
to preserve life or limb as unforeseeable unless the effort is made under such
circumstances as to be rash or wanton. Conduct is rash or wanton when it is
undertaken in utter disregard of the consequences, including both the risk to
the rescuer and the possible benefits to the person in peril. Therefore, you
should find the Plaintiffs actions in attempting to rescue another [were]
foreseeable unless those actions were rash or wanton in the sense that those
actions were undertaken in utter disregard of the consequences." '233
B. Comparative Negligence
While South Carolina has yet to address the rescue doctrine in light of
comparative negligence, both the Good Samaritan Statute and Brown indicate
that rescue is a highly valued service and should be encouraged. 4 If faced with
228. Id. at 438 (citing Ehrgott v. Mayor of New York, 96 N.Y. 264, 280-81 (1884)).
229. Id. at 437.
230. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 45 A. 1070, 1074 (1900)).
231. Id.
232. Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
233. Hubbard, supra note 102, at 19.
234. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (2005 & Supp. 2006); Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345,357,
105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958).
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this issue, South Carolina courts should hold that the rescue doctrine is only
partially subsumed by comparative negligence. Accordingly, a South Carolina
court would apply comparative negligence to a rescuer if his acts or omissions
during a rescue amount to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.
235
This standard, in addition to promoting rescue, is consistent with the application
of comparative negligence in South Carolina and the Good Samaritan Statute.236
South Carolina's Good Samaritan Statute allows anyone rendering aid to a
victim to avoid civil liability for negligence causing injury to the victim. 237 The
plain language of the statute evinces a policy to encourage rescue attempts. 238
If a South Carolina court held that comparative negligence completely
subsumes the rescue doctrine, the results of a rescuer's recovery under the Good
Samaritan Statute and the rescue doctrine would be paradoxical. Under the
statute, a rescuer would have no liability to the initial victim if the rescuer
injured the victim during the rescue unless his acts amounted to "gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. '239 However, if the rescuer
sustained an injury while negligently attempting the rescue, she would receive
no recovery or a reduced recovery under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
The Good Samaritan Statute and the rescue doctrine are interrelated and
should be interpreted similarly. Consistency and fairness in tort law are not
furthered if a rescuer is subject to two different standards-gross negligence
under the Good Samaritan Statute and mere negligence under the rescue
doctrine. In addition to an inconsistent result, rescuers would be discouraged
from intervening to aid those in imminent peril.
Many jurisdictions agree that allowing comparative negligence to subsume
the rescue doctrine is an undesirable policy for three reasons. First, these
jurisdictions find that application of comparative negligence to the rescue
doctrine is contrary to the legislative intent of good samaritan statutes.
240
Second, these states argue that the advent of comparative negligence does not
result in a change in common law duties.24 Last, other jurisdictions reason that
rescue is an admirable policy that the judicial system should encourage.242
The Fourth Circuit, in an admiralty case, set forth a strong argument that the
law should encourage rescue attempts and retain the Wagner standard. 243 If
given the occasion, the Fourth Circuit likely would not limit the Furka holding,
as rescue should be encouraged on all terrain. The reasoning is very persuasive
235. Cf § 15-1-310 (using the same language, "gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct,"
to set the negligence standard for a Good Samaritan).
236. Id.; see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 6, at 186-88, 191-93 (discussing how
recklessness, last clear chance, and assumption of risk have been handled by South Carolina courts




240. See, e.g, Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 639 (Kan. 1989).
241. Id. at 638-39.
242. Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 440, 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
243. See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1985).
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and consistent with South Carolina law. As a result, the rescue doctrine should
not be subsumed by comparative negligence because of the high regard the law
places on human life.
A South Carolina court could employ several different jury instructions
regarding the rescue doctrine and comparative negligence. A separate instruction
on comparative negligence should be given if the jury determines that the
rescuer's actions constituted grossly negligent, willful, or wanton misconduct.
1. "A person who is injured while attempting to rescue another from peril in an
emergency situation is not negligent merely on the ground that the rescue
entails danger to himself. The law has a high regard for human life and
efforts to save it. Danger invites rescue. The impulse to respond to an urgent
call for aid, without complete regard for one's own safety, is recognized as
normal. The law will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve life
unless made under such circumstances as to be rash or wanton. Conduct is
rash or wanton when it is undertaken in utter disregard of the
consequences.244 As Bridges suggests, a statement should conclude this
jury instruction noting that, if the jury finds the plaintiffs actions were not
rash or wanton, the plaintiff was not acting negligently.245
2. "Danger invites rescue., 246 The law places such a high value on human life
that the actions or omissions of a rescuer attempting to save another's life
are not considered negligent merely because of the inherently greater risk
associated with rescue.247 A reasonable rescue results if the rescuer's acts or
omissions do not constitute "gross negligence, willful, or wanton
misconduct.,
248
a. If you find that the plaintiff's acts or omissions during the rescue
attempt were reasonable, then you must award the plaintiff full
recovery of damages sustained as a result of the rescue.
b. If you find that the plaintiffs actions associated with the rescue
were not reasonable-that the actions amounted to gross
negligence, willful, or wanton conduct-then you must apply the
principles of comparative negligence set forth in the following
instruction.
3. "[T]he law makes special provision for persons who respond to an urgent
need for rescue in order to protect the life or limb of another. Therefore, if
Plaintiff is a rescuer, you should not find that his/her engaging in rescue
244. Bridges, 769 P.2d at 637.
245. See id. at 638.
246. Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921).
247. See Furka, 755 F.2d at 1088.
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-10-310 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
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efforts was negligent in any way unless you find that Plaintiffs conduct in
undertaking these rescue efforts was done in bad faith or involved gross




The rescue doctrine promotes selfless bystanders' efforts to aid in the
preservation of human life. If confronted with whether comparative negligence
subsumes the rescue doctrine, a South Carolina court would be wise to follow
the courts of Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, and Rhode Island and hold that rescuers
should not be considered negligent unless their actions are reckless.25°
South Carolina's Good Samaritan Statute indicates the high value the state
places on rescue attempts by innocent bystanders. Subjecting a rescuer to two
different standards of care would lead to a judicially inconsistent result. In
addition to the Good Samaritan Statute, prior to comparative negligence, the
South Carolina Supreme Court indicated the importance of judicial consistency
and foreseeability of rescue in Brown.25" ' While not binding, but certainly
persuasive, the Fourth Circuit also held that rescue is to be encouraged and
comparative negligence only applies if the rescuer's actions are reckless.252
Therefore, in an effort to create a judicially sound decision consistent with
the legislative intent of the Good Samaritan Statute, South Carolina courts
should hold that comparative negligence does not apply to the rescue doctrine
unless the rescuer's acts or omissions constitute gross negligence, or willful or
wanton misconduct.
Yasamine J Christopherson
249. Hubbard, supra note 102, at 21.
250. See Lorie v. Std. Oil Co., 368 S.E.2d 765, 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Bridges v. Bentley, 769
P.2d 635, 640 (Kan. 1989); Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., 738 S.W.2d 440, 454 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987); Ouellette v. Carde, A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992).
251. Brown v. Nat'l Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 357, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958).
252. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1985), rev 'don
other grounds, 824 F.2d 330, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1987).
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